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Foucauldian Spaces 
Round Table Discussion with  
Lynne Huffer, Steven Ogden, Paul Patton, and Jana Sawicki,  
 
Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: The theme of this special section of Foucault Studies, 
“Foucauldian Spaces,” emerged out of the 2016 meeting of the Foucault Circle, where the four of you 
were participants. Each of the three individual papers contained in the special section critically 
deploys and/or reconceptualizes an aspect of Foucault’s work that engages and offers particular 
insight into the construction, experience, and utilization of space. We’d like to ask the four of you to 
reflect on what makes a space Foucauldian, and whether or not (and why or why not) you’d consider 
the space created by the convergence of and intellectual exchanges among an international group of 
Foucault scholars at the University of New South Wales in the summer of 2016 to be Foucauldian. 
 
Lynne Huffer: With the very first words of History of Madness (1961), Foucault draws his 
readers into an intensely spatial conception of history:  
 
At the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy disappeared from the Western world. At the edges of the 
community, at town gates, large, barren, uninhabitable areas appeared, where the disease no 
longer reigned but its ghost still hovered. For centuries, these spaces would belong to the domain 
of the inhuman.1 
 
I read this invocation of “large, barren, uninhabitable” spaces at the edge of the human as 
an opening frame for apprehending Foucault’s life-long attention to the violence of 
humanism and the historical sedimentation under which that violence is buried. If lepers 
are no longer the “others” of the human, the spaces they inhabited still exist. This means 
Foucauldian spaces are spectral, haunted by the ghosts of those whose exclusions we no 
longer witness but who form the forgotten, violent foundations of our knowledge and our 
culture. 
 In History of Madness, Foucault’s first major book, the same haunted spaces where 
leprosy once reigned outside the gates of medieval Paris will become, in the 17th century, a 
single space of confinement inside the city. But how can this be? How can outside spaces 
also be a single space inside? The answer is obvious (although my students sometimes miss 
it): as Paris developed over the course of the classical age, the city expanded, swallowing up 
the spaces “at the edges of the community” and incorporating them within a single, 
                                                   
1  Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 3. 
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normalizing grid. This movement of expansion and exclusion within describes the logic of 
settler colonialism, providing a spatial description of Foucault’s understanding of modern 
biopower as normalizing and self-referential. This shift from the leper to the plague model 
is easily tracked across a number of Foucault’s works, from History of Madness to Abnormal 
to Discipline and Punish. History of Madness, in particular, painstakingly traces the shift as 
post-Cartesian, moving from the cogito’s rejection of the madman to the inclusion of 
madness as so many positivities produced and apprehended by reason. The modern 
triumph of reason’s domain is the generalizing inclusion of all the little abnormals once 
rejected outside within the Cartesian ratio’s statistical domain. As History of Madness’s 
opening spectral space reminds us, that domain is haunted, its ghosts both produced and 
occluded by those rationalizing maneuvers. Foucault’s temporalizing, genealogical project 
is thus, also, a spatializing one: to excavate those “large, barren, uninhabitable” spaces that 
constituted the “domain of the inhuman.” 
 Bringing this spatializing logic to contemporary concerns, we might say that the 
leper haunts today’s asylums, prisons, detention centers, refugee camps, homeless shelters, 
and other spaces of exclusion within, from Guantanamo Bay to the Gaza Strip to Standing 
Rock to Belfast. The specter of “leprosy” still inhabits what Foucault calls today’s “carceral 
network,” which “takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other.”2 If, as 
Foucault claims, the panoptic society is a society of light—of “small theatres” that induce in 
all of us “a state of conscious and permanent visibility”3—his invocation of spectral spaces 
might be read as an invitation to turn toward society’s shadows. We should not understand 
this beckoning toward darkness as a reversal of the panopticon back into the dungeon, but 
rather as a genealogical gesture of solidarity with those petits fous—the “little mad ones”—
Foucault spent his life engaging through his work in the archives.4 Indeed, the archive is 
perhaps Foucault’s most important spatial tool. The archive functions as the Foucauldian 
double of the spectral spaces—leprosarium, General Hospital, asylum, prison, carceral 
network—where humanist violence is both produced and masked. 
 How might this sense of Foucauldian spaces help us to think about the 2016 meeting 
of the Foucault Circle at UNSW as a space of convergence and intellectual exchange among 
an international group of Foucault scholars? Here’s one thought: Just as History of Madness 
begins with an invocation of space, so too did the Foucault Circle. In usual fashion, Ben 
Golder kicked off the proceedings with a host’s welcome to all the conference participants. 
But less usual, at least in my experience, was Golder’s reminder, right from the start, that 
the space of the campus—the ground that literally supported our intellectual exchange— 
was colonized land once inhabited by aboriginal peoples. (I have never witnessed such a 
                                                   
2  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage, 1979), 301. 
3  Ibid, 200. 
4  Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 23. 
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reminder of the indigenous land on which the U.S. academy is built.) Golder’s invocation of 
aboriginal land produced, in the conference, the effect of a haunting. While Golder’s words 
did not restore justice to that particular space, UNSW’s Law School, his verbal gesture was 
hardly meaningless or inconsequential. In Foucauldian fashion, Golder’s remarks tore the 
scrim that formed the unseen backdrop for this academic occasion. We were called by 
Golder’s words to “restor[e] to [the] silent and apparently immobile soil” of the UNSW “its 
rifts, its instability, its flaws.”5 As he uttered the words, “aboriginal lands,” my own 
unconscious assumptions—about myself, my trip to Australia, my own knowledge 
practices—were disturbed. I suddenly saw myself sitting with ghosts, called to 
acknowledge the settler logic that brought me there. The specters remained there, hovering, 
throughout the week, unsettling the space of the Foucault Circle. 
 
Jana Sawicki:  Thank you, Lynne, for beginning with such a hauntingly beautiful 
description of the centrality and function of spatiality in Foucault's histories. You rightly 
suggest that one function of Foucault's preoccupation with such spectral spaces might be to 
produce solidarity with “abnormals” throughout the histories that he maps for us. If 
Foucault was so profoundly reluctant at times to speak as himself, this reluctance may have 
stemmed from his sensitivity to the inevitability that his own discourse would also cast its 
own shadows. 
 I want to gesture, for a moment, toward another angle from which we might address 
spatiality in Foucault's discourse, namely, one that focuses more narrowly on what 
Foucault actually says about a peculiar kind of space, namely, heterotopic space. As we all 
know, he did not say much about heterotopias after the late 60s. Yet there are at least three 
occasions where they figure centrally as a topic of discussion: the preface to The Order of 
Things, in which he is concerned with discursive spaces (1967) and with Borges, a lecture to 
architects from 1966 (published in 1984) entitled “Of Other Spaces,” in which he identifies 
some specific heterotopic spaces that he finds in his archival research, and a 1966 radio 
broadcast in which he focuses on social and cultural spaces. In particular, the 1966 lecture 
might provide the point of departure for another, slightly different meditation on space in 
our time, and perhaps, on the spatiality of the conference itself. 
 In this lecture Foucault invokes a history of spatiality and suggests that the “present 
epoch” might be one of space rather than time: “We are at a moment,” he says, “...when our 
experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a 
network that connects points and intersects with its own skein.”6 He goes on to describe his 
current epoch as one of “simultaneity,” “juxtaposition” and the “side-by-side” – in short, as 
composed of heterogeneous sites or spaces. [“We live inside sets of relations that delineates 
                                                   
5  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random 
House, 1970), xxiv. 
6  Michel Foucault, “Des Espace Autres,” Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité, October, 1984: 1-9, 
trans. Jay Miskowiec, 1. 
© Foucault Studies 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i24.5527 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 24, pp. 77-101, June 2018	
 80 
sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one 
another.”]7 The epochal space in this case is not an empty container, but a set of 
relationships between heterogeneous sites in which we find ourselves – much like 
Heidegger's idea of Being-in as “involved.” In any case, heterotopias assume a particular 
function in this heterogeneous ensemble of sites. They are “beside them” them, perhaps, 
queer, in some sense. They can mirror, contest, or invert the sites around them. Thus, they 
may serve as “counter-sites” – sites that make visible features of the existing order of things 
that might not otherwise be seen; they serve to problematize the present and expose the 
“unrealness” of the spaces that we occupy – their contingent and sometimes shaky 
foundations, as well as their shadows. 
 Yet, I am reluctant to consider our Foucault conference a counter-space, a space of 
resistance.  Things are surely more complicated than that. Consider this:  Foucault also 
describes heterotopic spaces as “involving systems of opening and closing.”8 In some cases, 
access might require having undergone rituals of purification. In others, the opening might 
be illusory – one might be in some sense partitioned off upon entry. Foucault's example of 
the latter is the motel. Open to just about anyone who can pay, but an opening that 
simultaneously separates off the entrants. It seems to me that our conference had features of 
both sites. After all, entry requires the proper credentials. Yet, at the same time, universities 
open themselves to all, but then partition off the entrants in disciplines, fields, niches, and 
so forth. We are allowed a space in which we can challenge the existing order of things, 
unsettle it, but in such a way as to be marked as critical, radical, “Foucauldian,” as in some 
way deviating from the status quo while operating within it. This marking or labeling can 
be a way of disarming it. I am not entirely pessimistic about the prospect of occupying such 
sites in ways that might shake things up, produce seismic activity that opens up other 
possibilities for thinking and being, but I am not optimistic either. Having said this, I am 
entirely aware that academic freedoms that I may be taking for granted are under threat at 
the moment.   
 
Paul Patton: Thanks Lynn and Jana for opening this discussion. I struggled for a while with 
the idea of “Foucauldian spaces” and especially with the question what makes a space 
Foucauldian. I appreciate the many ways in which Foucault is a spatial thinker, meaning 
one who thinks in spatial rather than temporal terms, but found it hard to go beyond the 
thought that there is nothing particularly “Foucauldian” about the spaces that he discusses: 
spaces of confinement, treatment, surveillance and so on. I am thinking of his well-known 
analyses of particular institutional spaces, such as asylums, hospitals and prisons, along 
with his discussion of architectural designs such as Ledoux’s Saltworks at Arc-et-Senans or 
Bentham’s Panopticon. 
                                                   
7  Ibid, 3. 
8 Ibid, 9. 
© Foucault Studies 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i24.5527 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 24, pp. 77-101, June 2018	
 81 
 There is a sense in which Foucault is a spatial thinker even when he is describing 
immaterial spaces such as the different formations of discourse in particular empirical 
domains during certain historical periods. Even though there is a history of such 
formations, Foucault’s concept of discourse is profoundly spatial, describing statements in 
terms of a series of regularities between different functions, and discursive formations in 
terms of the relations between statements via what he calls “systems of dispersion.” This 
way of thinking about discourse is no doubt related to his structuralism, if we can call it 
that. He appears to have an idiosyncratic understanding of structure, not unlike the one 
Deleuze outlines in his ‘What is structuralism?’ essay where structures are conceived as 
dispersed and differential systems of a certain kind. 
Foucault invokes a related understanding of structure at the beginning of “Different 
Spaces,” where he elaborates on his suggestion that the present age is more spatial than 
historical: 
 
Structuralism, or at least what is grouped under that somewhat general name, is the effort to 
establish, between elements that may have been distributed over time, a set of relations that 
makes them appear juxtaposed, opposed, implied by one another, that makes them appear, in 
short, like a kind of configuration.9 
 
He goes on to characterize the peculiar spatiality of modern Western existence in terms of 
“relations of emplacement” where these are, in effect, the relations that define a structure. 
His thesis is that “we live inside an ensemble of relations that define emplacements that are 
irreducible to each other and absolutely non-superposable.”10 
Like Jana, I was drawn back to this essay in trying to think through what might be a 
Foucauldian space. Here at least we are dealing with a spatial concept - the concept of a 
certain kind of space - that is particularly Foucauldian in the sense that it is a concept that 
he invented. “Different Spaces” is of course an occasional piece, not entirely at a tangent 
with his major works and the well-known analyses of institutional spaces, but certainly a 
more playful piece. For a minor essay by Foucault, it has nevertheless given rise to an 
extraordinary amount of secondary literature: there is even a website devoted to 
Heterotopian Studies.11 I was drawn to this essay not only because it seemed a defensible 
way to make sense of the notion of Foucauldian space but also because it seemed the most 
promising way to make sense of the suggestion that our Foucault Circle conference at 
UNSW Australia in June-July 2016 might be considered a Foucauldian space. If we consider 
                                                   
9  Michel Foucault, “Different Spaces,” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Volume 2: Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology, trans. Robert Hurley et al., ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: The New Press, 
1998), 175. 
10  Ibid, 178. 
11  Http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/contact/ 
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the defining traits of heterotopian spaces that he outlines, it is not difficult to include the 
academic conference among such spaces. 
        Conferences are a rite of passage for aspiring academics and to that extent a form of 
“crisis heterotopia” akin to those that Foucault mentions in modern societies. They are a 
kind of non-place, sometimes held on university campuses but often in hotels that could be 
anywhere, where scholars go to consummate or to reaffirm their status as researchers of 
national or international renown. 
There is no doubt a history of the academic conference to be written, if it has not 
been written already, in which the development of these gatherings and the many forms 
they now take might be traced across the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Conferences serve a variety of purposes that differ widely from one academic field or 
discipline to the next, and they come in all sizes. 
In every case, however, they bring together a diverse array of speakers in a 
particular discipline or on a particular topic. They represent more or less adequately the 
entire range of approaches, ideas or ideologies accepted within a given field at a given time. 
The Foucault Circle conference draws a relatively narrow band of speakers defined by their 
relation to a particular oeuvre, but it still has the capacity to “juxtapose in a single real place 
several emplacements that are incompatible in themselves” such as a Weberian, an 
Agambenian, an Ancient Greek or a biopolitical Foucault.12 
        Conferences are part of the annual cycle of academic life, but they are also an escape 
from the weekly routines of teaching, supervising and administering. To that extent they 
are comparable to those transitory heterotopias such as the festivals, fairs, and Club 
Méditerranée holidays that Foucault mentions. Conferences are another way for academics 
to visit exotic locations far from their usual emplacements. They enable them to travel back 
in time if they are held in castles in the old world, or forward in time if they are held in the 
most advanced sectors of the new world 
They also exhibit the peculiar forms of openness and closure that Foucault lists as a 
fifth characteristic of heterotopias. Most academic conferences impose conditions on 
attendance and some even involve rigorous pre-selection of participants and refereeing of 
papers. But even those that are relatively open to academics and students, like the huge 
mass-market disciplinary conferences that accept anyone willing and able to pay the 
registration fees, have their inner hierarchies and systems of exclusion. 
The final trait that Foucault describes is perhaps the most difficult to apply to the 
academic conference. This involves their function in relation to the space that remains, 
which I take to mean the academic space from which they derive and which in some ways 
they reflect, like the mirror that provides his first example of a heterotopian space. This 
function is “spread between two extreme poles:” 
 
                                                   
12  Foucault, “Different Spaces,” 181. 
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Either the heterotopias have the role of creating a space of illusion that denounces all real space, 
all real emplacements within which human life is partitioned off, as being even more illusory. 
Perhaps it is this role that was played for a long time by those famous brothels which we are now 
deprived of. Or, on the contrary, creating a different space, a different real space as perfect, as 
meticulous, as well-arranged as ours is disorganized, badly arranged, and muddled. This would 
be the heterotopia not of illusion but of compensation, and I wonder if it is not somewhat in that 
manner that certain colonies functioned.13 
 
Space of illusion or space of compensation, brothel or colony, it is hard to know where the 
contemporary academic conference sits along this continuum. It is just possible to imagine a 
conference that so fulfilled our dreams of pure intellectual camaraderie and exchange that 
the real academic world seemed by contrast a poor reflection. Plato’s Symposium provides a 
classical model, but a more contemporary version might be a kind of academic Westworld 
where participants get to shoot down or seduce as many hosts as they like, or where they 
can play a role in their chosen conference narrative and revolutionise a field or start a 
movement like Derrida did in Baltimore in 1967. In a similar vein, it is possible to imagine a 
conference as meticulously organized, well planned and executed as the university is 
currently disorganized, badly planned and unsure of its purpose and function in the larger 
social and economic world, but I have yet to attend such an event. 
 Real conferences like the one we attended fall well below and between these 
extremes, but they nevertheless remain an important space in the academic world. Neither 
denunciations of nor compensations for the realities of academic life, they are still spaces 
where there is a relatively free exchange of ideas among participants with shared or 
overlapping interests, where new relations and new connections are established, and where 
participants are enabled to think differently about things they thought they knew. In a 
passage from The Use of Pleasure that Deleuze read out at Foucault’s funeral, he asked in 
what after all does philosophical activity consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to 
what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already 
known?14 
 
Steven Ogden: Thank you, Lynne, Jana, and Paul for your insights on Foucauldian spaces 
and the 2016 Foucault Circle Conference. On reflection, I find myself being drawn to the 
beach at Coogee. I was staying there during the conference. And every morning, I’d leave 
that wonderful coastal space and walk to the conference space on the UNSW campus. I 
enjoyed the conference, but I resisted leaving the beach. But what about these Foucauldian 
spaces? Regrettably, Foucault did not develop his spatial approach fully, but it was an 
important part of his gaze. From language to asylums and prisons, he interprets the world 
                                                   
13  Ibid, 184. 
14  Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1990), 9. 
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spatially. Foucault himself was aware of the untapped potential of his spatial reflections,15 
which have been pursued by a raft of scholars, across a range of disciplines.16 Curiously, he 
often refers to “fields;” perhaps the field has the same spatial status in France, as the beach 
in Australia? 
 In addition, there is a wider debate about space and place, and which of these 
concepts has epistemological primacy.17 Partly semantic? Not quite, but certainly revealing 
of different starting points. This debate, however, does not always do Foucault’s spatial 
practice justice. While Foucault takes things seriously, there is also often an element of play, 
which encompasses the objective and subjective dimensions of experience, including the 
imagination. Foucault, however, does not ultimately develop the concept of the 
imagination, but he signals its importance early in his career.18 This importance is apparent 
in his references to the “force” or “power” of the imagination, as well as in the implicit link 
Foucault draws between imagination and space in the concept of the heterotopic 
imagination. Arguably, it is through the imagination that a place, even a non-place, 
becomes a lived space. So, what exactly can we say about Foucauldian spaces? 
 As Paul prefigured, it is hard to define in precise terms what is meant by 
Foucauldian spaces. So, I am focusing on Foucault’s spatial practice, which is a way of 
seeing. This is Foucault’s gaze, what Deleuze referred to as Foucault’s “passion for seeing,” 
which challenges us to examine how we see spaces like beaches, campuses, and 
conferences.19 While tantalizing, it leaves us with ambiguity. Lynne caught something of 
this claiming that “Foucauldian spaces are spectral.” In my view, Foucauldian spaces 
embrace the subjective and the objective, the past and the present, clarifying some things 
and blurring others. As he protested, “I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate 
the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial 
distributions in which they find themselves . . . Each can only be understood through the 
other.”20 
 What about the Foucault Circle Conference space? I am not sure. As Jana reminds 
us, “entry requires the proper credentials” and not just the academic. In fact, the non-
academic credentials, working beneath the surface, are the most powerful, revealing “inner 
hierarchies and systems of exclusion.” So, I enjoyed the conference (and the beach), but was 
                                                   
15  Michel Foucault, “Questions on geography,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, ed., Colin Gordon, (New York: Vintage, 1980), 77. 
16  Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History, (New 
York: Continuum, 2001), 3. 
17  Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 1998), 300-301. 
18  Michel Foucault, “Introduction,” in Michel Foucault and Ludwig Binswanger, Dream and Existence, 
ed. Keith Hoeller, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1993), 33; 56. 
19  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 50. 
20  Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, 
Volume 3: Power, trans. Robert Hurley et al., ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: The New Press, 2000), 356. 
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left wondering about the conference space per se. Is it a counter-space or, under 
neoliberalism, an alternative space of social ordering?21 
 
Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: Does “prison” continue to be a Foucauldian space? 
Depending upon how you responded above, this question could perhaps be more accurately posed in 
terms of whether prison continues to be a space of Foucauldian interest and concern – or some other 
terms altogether upon which we hope you’ll elaborate! We raise this question in light of mass 
incarceration in the United States and Australian “offshore processing” of asylum seekers and 
refugees, the devastating effects of these practices, and quiescence as well as resistance in the face of 
both. 
 
Jana Sawicki:  I love Paul's more upbeat account of the conference space. Mine is certainly 
less positive, though I must confess that I too often welcome the temporary suspension of 
routine academic life that I often experience at them. And once one is tenured and less 
under scrutiny in the academy's panoptic and normalizing regime, they can be quite 
pleasurable as well!  
 Reading his response also suggested a way of thinking about the second question we 
have been asked to consider – the question concerning how Foucault might respond to 
contemporary prisons, offshore processing of asylum seekers and refugees, and, I would 
add offshore sites of indefinite detention such as Guantanamo. The latter strikes me as the 
sort of mirror that reveals illusory aspects as well as costs of the freedoms that the U.S., for 
one, is allegedly defending.  
 A brief search on the Internet reveals that many academics familiar with Foucault's 
work continue to find it useful for addressing such contemporary spaces of exclusion, 
punishment and surveillance. Much of it concerns the rise of neoliberalism and tracks 
important changes in how power is exercised. Some, for example, point out that 
disciplinary power has become less central under this new regime of capitalism – that 
insofar as individuals are treated as “entrepreneurs of themselves,” as human capital, they 
assume the bulk of responsibility for investing in themselves, for disciplining themselves, 
for developing themselves. In this system some individuals are deemed less valuable, or 
dispensable – not having invested enough in themselves.  
 It seems that Foucault was drawn to the relative freedom from discipline and 
normalization that neoliberal thought promised, that it might offer the prospect of a 
plurality of spaces where individuals and groups might experiment with ways of living. 
Moreover, because he was critical of the bureaucratic and disciplinary features of socialism 
in France, as well as the exclusion of the new left by traditional Marxists, perhaps he 
considered neoliberal thought a resource for another type of “socialist governmentality.” 
                                                   
21  Kevin Hetherington, The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering, (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 139. 
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The literature on Foucault and neoliberalism is full of tensions about where he stood with 
respect to it. I regard his discussion of it as more descriptive than prescriptive, but one can 
still ask why he chose to address it in the way he did.  
 In any case, it is easy to imagine him deploring mass incarcerations, detention 
centers, offshore processing and so forth, but perhaps his critical response would have 
required a different mapping of power relations than that with which he was operating in 
the 1970s. To be sure, one still sees disciplinary power operating in prisons. Privatized 
prisons that make up the so-called prison-industrial complex surely require 
discipline. Prisons do not necessarily resemble detention centers or offshore processing 
sites.  One has to identify their different functions, see how they draw upon extant 
techniques of power, and invent new ones in order to develop strategies for resisting 
them.     
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Steven Ogden:  
Getting inside our heads 
The prison is a Foucauldian space in neoliberal social ordering. As such, Foucault’s 
conception of prison is still relevant, but needs to be put in a wider political context. By 
doing so, both sovereign power and disciplinary power re-emerge in the context of “mass 
incarceration” and “offshore processing.” With offshore processing, for example, we have a 
new form of prison, which is a disciplinary tactic that arises in conjunction with the extra-
legal practices of the Australian government, producing docile bodies, as well as shaping 
public discourse. 
 For Foucault, the prison marked a relatively “new tactic” in nineteenth century 
Europe, reflecting new emerging discursive practices relating to disciplinary society.22 
Foucault’s interest in the prison echoed his interest in the military, and, as Lynne signaled, 
the transition from practices surrounding the treatment of lepers to new responses to the 
plague. Specifically, for Foucault the prison reflected the transition from sovereign power to 
disciplinary power. Instead of public displays of torture intimidating the crowd (i.e. 
collective), power is expressed by getting inside our heads (i.e. individuals), so much so that 
Foucault declared “the soul is the prison of the body.”23 Interestingly, Judith Butler picks up 
nuances of Aristotelian causality here,24 which in Foucault has links with the Catholic 
tradition of material-formal causality.25 
 Foucault read Aristotle, but as a child, he attended Mass at St. Porchaire Poitiers 
with his siblings and grandmother. This was during the reign of Pius XI (1922-1939); a 
period in which church life was dominated by neo-Thomist thinking and practices. The 
church of Saint Porchaire itself is a heterotopic space. The double-nave building, lacking a 
church yard or buffering space, between it and the township, adjoins other buildings. 
Admittedly, Foucault as an adult was not a practising Catholic, but he was not anti-Church, 
which helps explain in part his astute critique of the church. Nonetheless, by osmosis, it 
seems reasonable to speculate that he had been influenced implicitly by a neo-Thomistic 
construal of material/formal causality, which was originally grounded in Aristotle. In 
simple terms, the character of matter is realized by virtue of its form, likewise, the character 
of a body is realized by virtue of its soul. In Foucault’s case, and under disciplinary power, 
the formative role of the soul is decisive as “the soul is the prison of the body.”26 This 
                                                   
22  Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973, trans. Graham Burchell, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 99. 
23  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30. 
24  Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” (London and New York, 
Routledge, 1993, 2011), 9. 
25  Foucault, The Punitive Society, for example, “what the hospital is for the body, the prison is for 
the soul,” 91.	
26  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 181. 
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Thomistic nuance, however, should not be exaggerated, but it serves as a reminder that 
Foucault’s work did not emerge in theoretical isolation. So, what about the prison? 
 In the prison, the focus is on individual bodies, such that, by getting inside our 
heads, the soul becomes the prison of the body. In this light, neoliberalism has vested 
interests in the deployment of both sovereign and disciplinary power in order to create 
sated docile bodies of self-interested entrepreneurs, where “Rank in itself serves as a 
reward or punishment.”27 Neoliberalism is panopticism writ large, from CCTV cameras to 
credit card details, constituting the finely calibrated, virtually invisible, art of subjection. In 
an Australian context, the offshore centres of Manus and Nauru become new forms of 
disciplinary power, as the Australian government exercises sovereign power. Hence, the 
macrophysics of sovereign power and the microphysics of disciplinary power are not 
eliminated, but reformulated, under modern governmentality. So, what about these new 
offshore spaces? 
 
Extra-legal prisons “in” Australia 
The modern debate on sovereignty begins with Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. In short, 
when is state violence justified? In contemporary terms, then, under exceptional 
circumstances, the state does not have to adhere to the law, or the state can change the law. 
As such, the sovereign is the one who decides on the exception. For example, faced with a 
terrorist threat, a prime minister or president authorises the government to impinge on the 
rights of citizens, all for the sake of national security. 
 Foucault was aware of the power of sovereignty. He sought to address the issue of 
“power without the king,”28 recognizing the persistence of sovereign forms of power. This 
often involves the use of disciplinary tactics. In institutions, for example, the neoliberal 
agenda is managed by the use of disciplinary power: “Is it surprising that prisons resemble 
factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”29  In other words, the 
prison is constantly resurfacing as a place of social ordering. 
 Lastly, offshore processing in Australia is an example of such ordering. In terms of 
context, aquatic spaces, like Coogee beach, figure prominently in the Australian imaginary. 
According to official discourse, offshore processing was developed as a deterrent in order 
to protect refugees from drowning at sea. So, without trial, and ignoring human rights, 
refugees were sent across the sea to the islands of Manus and Nauru. As such, Manus and 
Nauru are spaces of exclusion. On the one hand, they were created, outside the law, as a 
public display of sovereign power, making a point to potential people smugglers and the 
                                                   
27  Ibid, 266. 
28  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, (New 
York: Vintage, 1990), 91. 
29  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 228. 
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Australian people. On the other hand, observation, judgment, examination transform 
internees into docile bodies and Foucauldian delinquents.30 
 
Paul Patton: The nature and function of prisons further complicates the question of 
Foucauldian space. We tend to think of prisons as disciplinary spaces, seeing them through 
the lens of Foucault’s analysis of the prison as an exemplary institution organized in terms 
of the spatial and temporal ordering of activities that was central to disciplinary power. We 
should not, however, overlook the penultimate chapter of Discipline and Punish, in which he 
notes that the failure of the prison to achieve its disciplinary aims was coterminous with the 
advent of the prison as the primary form of judicial punishment in Western societies, and 
that prisons have survived and even proliferated in part because they serve a variety of 
other political and economic functions. 
        The extraordinary growth of prisons and prison populations in countries such as 
Australia and the U.S. should be understood in these terms. They serve a range of political 
and economic functions that have little to do with producing docile subjects. Bernard 
Harcourt and others have drawn attention to the extraordinary overcrowding in U.S. 
prisons, to the point that they are little more than warehouses for a remarkably constant 
section of the population. This is a consequence of mandatory sentencing policies that allow 
politicians to appear to be doing something about crime rates, but also sustains the 
profitable business of running and servicing such prisons. Whereas in the US the larger part 
of the prison population is African American, in Australia it is Indigenous people who 
make up a disproportionate share of those imprisoned: Aboriginal people constitute just 
under 3% of the population but 28% of the prison population. Imprisonment remains a key 
element of the ongoing process of colonisation by reinforcing the exclusion, 
marginalisation, and demoralization of the broader Indigenous population. This is not a 
function of imprisonment that Foucault discussed, but it is one that is perfectly consistent 
with his analysis of the political polyfunctionality of the carceral archipelago. 
        Foucault’s history of the prison illuminates some features of modern imprisonment, 
but it is a history that focuses on certain features (producing docile bodies, reproducing 
delinquency) and on a particular period at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century. He noted in a 1977 discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon that “the 
procedures of power at work in modern societies are much more numerous, diverse and 
rich” than the principles of permanent visibility so important to Bentham and that 
“disciplinary power was in fact already in Bentham’s day being transcended by other and 
much more subtle mechanisms for the regulation of phenomena of population, controlling 
their fluctuations and compensating their irregularities.”31 From our present standpoint, I 
think that we can see not only that disciplinary techniques have been overtaken by a variety 
                                                   
30  Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 91. 
31  Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 148; 160. 
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of other mechanisms for the control of individual and collective behaviour, but also that 
disciplinary techniques themselves have been transformed and applied in new domains 
and by means of new technologies. The proliferation of surveillance techniques is an 
obvious example: not only the use of CCTV both inside institutions and on the streets and 
motorways, but also the range of technological means to track individual movements, 
consumption patterns, political and sexual desires via the internet, GPS location devices 
and the range of voluntarily adopted social media platforms. At least in relation to the 
principle of permanent visibility, our society is disciplinary to a much greater degree than 
was possible in the nineteenth century, when mechanisms of surveillance were limited to 
lines of sight of individual overseers. In this sense, a key component of the disciplinary 
power that Foucault sought to characterise has metamorphosed, swarmed and proliferated 
far beyond the institutional sites that were the focus of his analysis. 
       Conversely, I think that the institutional form of the prison has been transformed 
and transposed to new domains of political functionality. The range of offshore detention 
centres is a good example of this process. Neither the U.S. sites used for the detention of 
suspected terrorists nor the Australian centres for the detention of asylum seekers have 
anything to do with rehabilitation or behavioural modification (the devastating 
psychological effects on long term detainees are probably an unintended consequence). 
While the Manus Island detention centre maintains extensive surveillance of detainees, 
through all available means including CCTV, computer, and telephone monitoring, the 
reasons for doing so have more to do with controlling the flow of information to outside 
media and limiting the risk of “reputational damage” to the Australian government than 
with encouraging behavioural change among detainees.32 
The very existence of offshore detention centres such as Manus Island even 
complicates the distinction that Foucault draws between sovereign and disciplinary power, 
as Steven suggests. The political purpose of these centres is to discourage asylum seekers 
from even attempting to land in Australia by boat. They are explicitly defended in these 
terms as part of a wider effort to disrupt the business model of “people smugglers.” As 
such, their strategic purpose is closer to that of the spectacular displays of capital 
punishment practised by sovereign power than to the enclosed and silent means of 
disciplinary incarceration. The display of sovereign power sought to deter by fear of 
consequences rather than by transforming delinquents into docile subjects. Although the 
detention centres are a kind of prison, their primary political function is to make it known 
that so called “illegal arrivals” will spend years in this kind of limbo with no prospect of 
settlement in the promised land of freedom and opportunity. 
 
Lynne Huffer: Prison is a quintessential Foucauldian term. And Foucault’s book about its 
                                                   
32  Ben Doherty, “Scale of Surveillance in Manus Island Detention Centre Laid Bare,” The Guardian 
Australia, 19 May 2017.	
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“birth,” Discipline and Punish (1975), is perhaps his most well-known work. But what exactly 
is this prison whose birth the book describes? It is not a physical building or institution but 
what Foucault calls “man”: his genealogy explores how “a specific mode of subjection 
[assujettissement] was able to give birth to man.”33 The birth of the prison is the birth of man: a 
man, Foucault writes, “whom we are invited to free,” but who “is already in himself the 
effect of a subjection much more profound than himself.”34 
Might we reexamine the early 21st-century meaning of prison through the 
specifically Foucauldian lens of subjection? Steven helpfully reminded us that for Foucault 
prison is about power “getting inside our heads.” In his famous description of Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault writes that “a real subjection is born mechanically from a 
fictitious relation” and that man “becomes the principle of his own subjection.”35 The 
mechanism of that subjection is “the modern soul”:36 “a ‘soul’ inhabits [man] and brings 
him to existence.”37 And what is this soul that subjects us? It is the “reality-reference” that 
gives us “psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.”38, a sedimentation of 
“sentiments, love, conscience, instincts.”39 Soul is our psychic interiority: an in-carceration, a 
modern “great confinement.” Today, more than ever, we must take seriously this psychic 
resonance of prison: “the soul [as] the prison of the body.”40 
I return to Foucault’s famous imprisoning soul as a way to address our second 
question: Does prison continue to be a space of Foucauldian interest and concern? 
Specifically, I want to rethink the soul as prison in relation to the already disastrous reign of 
the 45th U.S. president. How might Foucault’s soul-as-prison help us to think about 
Trumpism, democracy’s fragility, and the possible resurgence of fascism in the 21st century? 
Foucault helps us to see how fascism is made possible through the panoptical crafting of 
modern subjection. If prison is a power that gets “inside our heads,” an analysis of how that 
in-carceration plays out in the age of Trump seems crucial to strategizing ways of resisting 
fascism. As Foucault warned in his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus 
(1972), we must develop strategies and tactics to counter “the fascism . . . in our heads and 
in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing 
that dominates and exploits us.”41 
                                                   
33  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 24. 
34  Ibid, 30. 
35  Ibid, 202-203. 
36  Ibid, 23. 
37  Ibid, 30. 
38  Ibid, 29-30. 
39  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, 
Volume 2, 369. 
40  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30. 
41  Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xiii. 
© Foucault Studies 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i24.5527 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 24, pp. 77-101, June 2018	
 92 
The connection I’m drawing here between Foucault’s thinking about prison and his 
thinking about fascism is not accidental. Foucault wrote the introduction to Anti-Oedipus at 
a time when he was deeply immersed in anti-prison activities with the French Prisons 
Information Group (Groupe d’information sur les prisons, or GIP). The GIP was founded 
by Foucault, Deleuze, Naquet, Domenach, and others in 1971 to contest the intolerable 
conditions of French prisons; its primary purpose was to “give prisoners the floor,” and it 
explicitly linked itself to the struggles of the Black Panthers and other anti-prison groups 
around the world. Although as an activist group the GIP was short-lived (1971-72), its 
“work” continues today in a number of ways. The GIP persists, for example, in the form of 
Discipline and Punish (1975); as a book Foucault wrote in the wake of the GIP it bears the 
traces of that political activity. Even more important, contemporary anti-prison theorists 
and activists are now returning to GIP documents from the early 1970s for new perspectives 
on mass incarceration in the early 21st century. Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons 
Information Group, and the Future of Abolition (2016), edited by Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts, 
is one recent example of that effort.42 Thus the GIP continues to serve an important 
genealogical function: As a counter-archive, it contests the police network of surveillance 
and registration that produced the prison as an archive of violence. If Discipline and Punish 
is a genealogy of the power “inside our heads,” we might view the GIP archive as a 
counter-force with the capacity to unsettle that subjection. 
How might this apply to modern-day Trumpism? I think the anti-immigrant, anti-
Black, misogynist, planet-destroying politics we call Trumpism is at least in part a result of 
the prison that is “the fascism in us all, in our heads.”43 In Undoing the Demos, Wendy Brown 
has suggested that “we the people” no longer exist: thanks to neoliberalism, homo 
economicus has squeezed the breath out of homo politicus.44 If Brown is right, the soul that 
imprisons our contemporary body politic is narcissistic, profit-driven, and entrepreneurial. 
It is governed internally by the panoptical hall of mirrors that is Twitter, Snap Chat, and 
reality TV. This assemblage “define[s] power relations in terms of the everyday life of 
men.”45 It is generalizable, which means “it can in fact be integrated into any function 
(education, medical treatment, production, punishment).”46 It produces subjection by 
“multiple methods of ‘incarceration,’”47 as Jana points out, constituting what Foucault calls 
                                                   
42  See Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition, 
eds. Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
43  Foucault, “Preface,” xiii. 
44  Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 
2015). 
45  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 205. 
46  Ibid, 206. 
47  Ibid, 308. 
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“a subtle, graduated, carceral net”—a “great carceral continuum”—that “diffuse[s] 
penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines.”48 
The monstrous entrepreneur who sits in the White House is a grotesque avatar of 
the soul-as-prison whose birth Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish. If the birth of the 
prison can be tracked through a genealogy of the modern soul, Trumpism marks the 
flourishing of that soul as the power “inside our heads.” Trumpism epitomizes the 
manifestation of a panoptical technology of incitement and persuasion, from The Apprentice 
to Fox News to error-ridden presidential tweets. We are all components of that technology, 
that prison, those mechanisms of incarceration. We can rage against Trump and counter his 
lies with well-honed displays of truth. But that rage and that truth will not free us from 
ourselves, from our episteme, from “the fascism . . . in our heads and in our everyday 
behavior.” Our mostly unconscious, everyday, mundane reliance on various forms of 
securitization—the production of delinquency, mass incarceration, anti-immigrant policies, 
“generalized policing,” the “perpetual surveillance of the population”49 —underscores our 
collective investment in a carceral regime that has “no outside.”50  
“Is it surprising” then, Foucault asks, “that prisons resemble factories, schools, 
barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”51 Assata Shakur echoes Foucault in 
describing her own experience of prison: “For many the cells are not much different from 
the tenements. . . The police are the same. The poverty is the same.”52 As a prison 
abolitionist concerned with the racialization of delinquency that drives the prison-industrial 
complex, Shakur reminds us not only that the prison has “no outside,” but also that carceral 
mechanisms of subjection produce “a play of truth and infamy”53 where some folks are 
more intensely incarcerated than others. Foucault describes the spectacle of “that other 
species, ‘the race apart that has the privilege of populating the convict-ships and prisons.’”54 
Trump’s criminalization of immigrants and foreigners, his race-baiting, and his incitement 
of white nationalist violence all painfully demonstrate the relevance of the prison-fascism 
connection in Foucault’s genealogy of modern subjection. Foucault’s prison thus poses for 
us an ethical challenge, like Anti-Oedipus, which Foucault retitled an Introduction to the Non-
Fascist Life, calling it a “book of ethics.”55 If the basic Socratic ethical question is “how are we 
                                                   
48  Ibid, 297. 
49  Ibid, 281. 
50  Ibid, 301. 
51  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 228. 
52  Assata Shakur, “Women in Prison: How We Are,” in The New Abolitionists: (Neo) Slave Narratives 
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53  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 259. 
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to live?,” prison today requires us to sharpen that question in the same way Foucault did as 
he read his friends’ work: how are we to live a non-fascist life? 
 
Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: Lynne’s response above provides a segue into our final 
question concerning the status of neoliberalism given recent developments in Western democracies 
such as the U.K., the U.S., and European countries such as France and Poland. Is the West 
witnessing a receding of (neo)liberalism in the face of nationalism and right-wing populism, its 
expansion in the form of plutocracy, a resurgence of fascism? In light of the Foucauldian perspective 
you’ve articulated in the previous questions, what is your response – and what might constitute a 
Foucauldian response – to these emergent (anti)political space(s)? 
 
Jana Sawicki: My response to the current situation with regard to neoliberalism, the rise of 
populism and nationalism, the racism undergirding some of it, and current fears that 
fascism is on the rise is definitely Foucauldian in spirit! How so? To answer this question, I 
cannot escape addressing how Foucault might respond today to developments in the thirty 
plus years since his death. There has been significant debate about his relationship to 
neoliberalism. I am sympathetic with those who suggest that he considered the 
governmental rationality of economic liberalism (including Ordoliberalism) a promising 
counter-strategy to both the statism of the French Left, and the humanism of the tradition of 
political liberalism that relies heavily upon philosophical anthropology.   
 While the session at the Sydney conference on Zamora and Behrent's collection, 
Foucault and Neoliberalism, did not settle the debate concerning how to understand 
Foucault's relationship to neoliberalism, it was helpful insofar as it highlighted the 
specificity of Foucault's concerns at the time, namely, resisting disciplinary and biopolitical 
normalization, the failures of French socialism to deliver on its promises, and the fact that 
the socialism had no governmental rationality of its own. I can think of myriad ways in 
which Foucauldian inspired thinkers might and do respond to what is happening today – 
presumably the responses will be limited to doing the sort of work that Foucault did, 
namely, problematizing dangerous trends within the intersection of three dimensions of 
current regimes of power-knowledge, that is, biopower—governmentality – freedom. They 
would be concerned with the dangers associated with domination and the concomitant 
reduction of possibilities for living (ethics), and with resisting tendencies toward micro- as 
well macro-fascism. Regimes of biopolitical power/knowledge can be found operating in 
medicine and universities, in the obsession with data collection by Google, in intelligence 
agencies all over the world, as well as in the techno-science of climate change and its effects 
on populations, to name a few. In the era of biopolitics, as Foucault understood in the mid-
70s, there is less concern about disciplining individuals than there is about identifying 
regularities or patterns in populations in order to develop policies, manipulate populations, 
and sell products, among other things. At the same time, disciplinary power has by no 
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means disappeared in every space, even if it is no longer a singular aspect of many 
contemporary societies. 
 What is the main danger? The answer to this question will partly depend upon 
where one is situated. Neoliberalism has taken different forms in different places and 
people have different relationships to it, experience it differently. Foucault's methods are 
available for many uses. I doubt that the main danger concerns who is currently in power in 
any given country (although I do not mean to minimize the impact, and certainly think it is 
important) as much as it does in what is happening on the ground, in the everyday lives of 
people who are very differently situated. Citizens in Western democracies can probably 
learn much about how to resist, survive, and sometimes carve out livable lives from 
populations in countries that have toggled from democracy to demagoguery more than 
once in in their lifetimes. 
 Now is a good time in the U.S. as well as other democracies under threat that face 
increased poverty and inequality to identify the socialist correctives to neoliberal 
governmentality – perhaps bolster movements for worker self-management, unionization, 
and basic income, but also to continue to find ways to use biopolitical power to move 
populations in different directions – to structure fields of possible action differently, to give 
populations a different range of choices, to invent new possibilities for viable ways of living 
so that individuals can “opt out” of the most pernicious trends in contemporary control 
societies. I think Foucault might agree. For although he appreciated some of the libertarian 
tendencies in economic liberalism as a governmental rationality, he would not be in favor of 
the reduction of real choices, and the increased power to manipulate populations despite 
the pervasive rhetoric of choice, freedom, and self-interest that we see today.  
 I realize that I have not answered the question very directly, and that this response is 
in some respects vague. But the point is that there are many dangerous trends within 
neoliberal and biopolitical regimes that have intensified over the course of thirty years in 
ways Foucault could not anticipate. We might need some new tools, but his general 
approach to addressing power and freedom could still be helpful. A hyper- and active 
pessimism still seems apropos to our current situation. 
 
Steven Ogden: The task of analysing the contemporary political space is daunting. On that 
note, Jana is right to focus our attention on present dangers, that is, “pernicious trends in 
contemporary control societies.” In response, I am addressing the rise of populism and 
nationalism. I am specifically interested in both Trump’s presidential discourse and 
practice, and the motivation of Trump voters. 
 At the beginning of his presidency, Trump positioned himself as the sovereign 
exception, discursively and practically (cf. executive powers). Discursively, Trump 
continues to present himself as a benevolent father figure, reassuring voters that they do 
not have to worry. Just leave the decisions, and the thinking, to him. As such, I am using 
Foucault’s schema of pastoral power to explore the dynamic between Trump and voters. In 
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the process, I am foreshadowing a future research area by positing that what makes this 
dynamic “pernicious” is an implicit, but powerful, demand for obedience, which reads as be 
loyal, despite facts, or divergent interests. So, in this case, neoliberalism, which appeals to 
economic self-interest, conceals trends leading to a “reduction in real choices.” But first, 
let’s start with neoliberalism, and Foucault’s notion of power-relations. 
 First, neoliberalism is “a peculiar form of reason that configures all aspects of 
existence in economic terms.”56 In Foucauldian terms, it “is a matter of making the market, 
competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of 
society.”57 Certainly, the confluence of Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics (1978-1979) and the 
elections of Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981) formed a defining moment in 
neoliberalism’s relatively short history. But what now? 
 Second, in Foucault, power is not easily defined. The interpretive key is power-
relations, which are complex, variable, productive, strategic, and coupled with knowledge, 
shaping human subjectivity. Foucault describes power-relations as, “the multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their 
own organization.”58 As such, power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches 
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives.”59 So, what is happening with Trump? The clue is pastoral 
power. 
 Foucault’s pastoral power was intended to explain a political transition, in historical 
terms, from a disciplinary era to modern governmentality.60 It was not developed as a 
complete model. Basically, it describes the dynamic between leaders and followers, 
expressing it in terms of the relationship between shepherd and sheep, where “the tie with 
the shepherd is an individual one. It is personal submission to him.”61 In this context, the 
shepherd is responsible for each sheep; and each sheep is dependent on and obedient to the 
shepherd. Obedience is prized, as there is no salvific alternative. Ironically, the shepherd is 
willing to sacrifice the whole flock for a single sheep (Luke 15:4). 
 Pastoral power is “a beneficent power”62 and “a power of care,”63 which tells us 
something about modern subject formation, which includes “specific modes of 
                                                   
56  Brown, Undoing the Demos, 17. 
57  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, trans. Graham 
Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 148.	
58  Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 92. 
59  Foucault “Prison Talk,” in Power/Knowledge, 39. 
60  Michel Foucault “Politics and Reason,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other 
Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 67. 
61  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, trans. 
Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 126. 
62  Ibid, 127. 
63  Ibid, 184. 
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individualization.”64[9] In fact, the valorisation of obedience is part of the legacy of pastoral 
power, where “The relationship of submission of one individual to another individual, 
correlating an individual who directs and an individual who is directed, is not only a 
condition of Christian obedience, it is its very principle.”65 Arguably, under neoliberalism, 
all forms of power, including pastoral power, are harnessed to achieve economic goals. To 
that end, I am using Trump’s inauguration address66 as an example of how discourse can be 
used to simultaneously demand loyalty and justify sovereign practices. 
 Like a father figure, Trump reassures voters that things will be alright, and appeals 
to their self-interest. For instance, the inauguration address includes economic terms like 
“rewards,” “cost,” “wealth,” “enriched foreign industry,” “trillions of dollars overseas,” 
“made other countries rich,” concluding with “We will make America wealthy again.” 
Within this frame, Trump’s discourse echoes Foucault’s pastorate. An implicit contrast, for 
example, is made between Trump as true shepherd and false shepherds (e.g. Obama). This 
kind of contrast is embedded in the Christian imaginary, where Jesus is the good shepherd 
(John 10:11), which is set within the tradition of God as true shepherd, in contrast to the 
many false shepherds (Ezekiel 34:2). This theme resonates strongly with evangelical 
Christians, many of whom supported Trump. 
 Having expressed great care, Trump demands “total allegiance to the United States” 
emphasizing the need for mutual self-sacrifice in the face of real danger (cf. “I will build a 
great wall”). In contrast to the false shepherds, Trump will restore America’s “promise for 
all our people,” which will entail “transferring power… back to you.” Apparently, he is 
willing to lay down his life for the sheep, as “I will fight for you with every breath in my 
body.” Along the way, his discourse is infused with religious rhetoric like “a righteous 
public,” “The Bible tells us,” and “the same almighty Creator.” In a prophetic lament, he 
proclaims he has not forgotten the lost sheep, and that struggling families, as well as 
forgotten people, “will never be ignored again.” 
 In conclusion, the status of neoliberalism is a matter of debate. In broad terms, 
however, the market is the site of truth where “economic behavior is the grid of 
intelligibility.”67 So, on the basis of a mix of economic self-interest and fear of the other, 
Trump implicitly demands obedience. In the face of terror, the good shepherd can do 
whatever he needs to do. After all, obedience is prized, and there is no salvific alternative. 
 
Paul Patton: There is no doubt that we are in the midst of a popular backlash against the 
effects of neoliberal economic government. Neoliberal reform of government policy at both 
domestic and international levels has played a major role in transforming economies 
around the world. The work of Thomas Piketty and others has documented the resultant 
                                                   
64  Ibid, 175, see n. 29 textual error. 
65  Ibid, 8. 
66  Inaugural address as prepared. 
67  The Birth of Biopolitics, 252. 
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massive increase in inequality. The opening up of domestic economies to international 
competition, the deregulation of currencies and increased mobility of capital have had 
devastating effects on the working populations of certain sectors in what were once 
advanced industrial economies. Governments of both the left and right for many years 
pursued policies aimed at deregulating markets, increasing competition and restricting 
various forms of protection or subsidy for producers and consumers in some sectors of the 
economy. While parties on the left sought to justify this market-oriented path towards 
economic growth by distributing some of the benefits more widely, right wing parties 
relied on an unsustainable combination of neoliberal policies and social conservatism that 
pandered to the illiberal religious and other beliefs of their constituencies. Brexit in the UK 
and the election of Trump in the U.S. represent, among other things, the end of those 
political strategies.  
While neoliberal ideas about economic management have played an important role 
in the history of government since the 1980s, these are not necessarily the ideas that 
Foucault discussed at length in his 1979 lectures, nor are they the only factor in the rapid 
changes to the global economy since then. The “German model” that he gave as a reason for 
devoting lectures to the discussion of the principles of the social market economy did not 
have the impact in France and elsewhere that he thought it might. At the same time, other 
economic and political models have been remarkably successful with resultant impacts on 
Western economies. 1978, the year in which Foucault began to lecture about 
“governmentality,” was also the year in which Deng Xiaoping approved the reforms in 
agriculture that eventually led to the introduction of a market economy in China and its 
remarkably successful integration into the global market of goods, services and capital. 
China’s is now the largest manufacturer and exporter of goods in the world, so there is 
some truth to the Trump campaign complaint that China has “stolen American jobs.” There 
is also evidence that neoliberal economic ideas played a role, both externally and internally, 
in China’s rapid economic growth. This is but one of a number of neoliberal governmental 
trajectories outside the purview of Foucault’s lectures in 1979. Nevertheless, it would be 
interesting to explore further the role of neoliberalism in China’s economic development 
since 1978, and indeed whether the novel combination of party rule and a socialist market 
economy represents an unanticipated answer to the question posed about the nature of 
socialist governmentality at the end of the fourth lecture.68 
Neoliberalism is not the only reason for the tectonic shifts in the global distribution 
of economic and military power that have made the present a more uncertain if not more 
dangerous world. The development of new forms of non-conscious cognition and their 
                                                   
68  “What would really be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? Is there a governmentality 
appropriate to socialism?” The Birth of Biopolitics, 94. On the question of governmentality in post-reform 
China, see for example ed. Elaine Jeffreys, China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing 
Government, (New York: Routledge), 2009.	
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implementation in intelligent machines promises to steal many more jobs, and not only in 
America. The effects of global warming on the natural environment have only just begun to 
impact on many people’s lives. But the same economic, technological and cultural 
developments make possible new forms of life that were unimaginable in 1978. The global 
interconnection of individuals and populations, currencies no longer tied to sovereign 
control of monetary systems, a variety of renewable energy sources, regional and 
indigenous challenges to the authority of multi-national states are but a few of the 
developments that point toward the possibilities for a more cosmopolitan, egalitarian and 
sustainable future. It is not yet clear whether we are living through a new age of 
enlightenment or the beginnings of a new age of darkness and misery. Either way, 
Foucault’s commitment to a practice of philosophy that works on the limits of the present 
has never seemed more apposite. 
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